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ABSTRACT: We will summarize the most systematic work on George W. Bush's psyche, 
stressing that leader personality traits should not be judged as good nor bad: Rather traits which 
match some situations mismatch others.  SAT scores and other available measures indicate that 
Bush has sufficient intelligence to serve as president.  Yet the best studies, in which raters 
evaluate statements without being aware of their source, suggest that Bush lacks integrative 
complexity and thus views issues without nuance (Thoemmes and Conway 2007).  The leading 
personality theory (the “5-Factor Model”), as measured by the NEO Personality Inventory, 
suggests that Bush is highly extraverted but not very agreeable or conscientious. He also rates 
low on “Openness to Experience” (Rubenzer and Faschingbauer 2004).  Similarly Immelman 
(2002) had expert raters judge Bush‟s personality using the Millon Inventory of Diagnostic 
Criteria. Raters identified Bush as fitting the “Outgoing,” “Dominant (Controlling),” and 
“Dauntless” personality patterns, which together constitute a style given to lack of reflection, 
superficiality, and impulsivity.  When compared to other presidents, Bush most closely resembles 
Jackson, Reagan, and Harding, but is very unlike his father, George H.W. Bush.   
We apply these findings to discussions of the President Bush's decision-making in the 
cases of his most notable success, education reform, and his most notable failure, the Iraq war. 
We argue that Bush's psychological predispositions were particularly noteworthy in the latter, in 
part since greater presidential power in foreign policy magnifies the impacts of leader 
personality. 
 
Comic routines to the contrary, there is nothing dumb about George W. Bush. At the 
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same time, as other works in this volume suggest, President Bush has psychological 
characteristics which limited his competence as a "decider" (to use his term), and ultimately 
undermined the administration. Arguably, President Bush had strategic competence: a vision of 
where he wanted to push government compatible with national needs.  He thus could have 
become a president of achievement (Nelson 1993). However, the President seemingly lacked the 
tactical competence to hew to and implement his vision. President Bush had bad luck in the 
Hurricane Katrina, and White House insiders believed that the Democratic opposition would 
attack no matter what the President did (Feaver 2008). Indeed increased partisanship is a feature 
of modern American politics (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000). Yet Bush's personal psychology also 
played a key role in his presidential failures.  We believe that George W. Bush's tendency to 
personalize policy-making, his unwillingness to seriously entertain opposing views, his disdain 
for detail, his enthusiasm for new challenges, and his reluctance to admit error and change 
course, led to both successes and failures.  Ultimately, the very substantial failures in Iraq 
doomed George W. Bush's second term agenda, and cloud his legacy.   We will summarize the 
better work on George W. Bush's psyche, stressing that leader personality traits should not be 
judged good or bad: Rather personality traits which match some situations mismatch others.  We 
will apply this with a brief discussion of the President Bush's most notable success, education 
reform. Here, his prior experience and knowledge, ebullient salesmanship, and holding firm to 
ideas whose time had come led to success.  We will follow with a more substantial discussion of 
President Bush's singular failure, Iraq.  
As discussed in chapter 1, presidents have more power in foreign policy, magnifying the 
impacts of personality on policy. Further, as shown by Jervis (1976; 2008), national security 
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policy involves highly uncertain information, calling for leaders to seek and integrate new 
information.  Finally, all leaders learn from history, and the particular histories of education 
policy and relations with Iraq, influenced the president and other policy-makers in ways few have 
discussed.  Past history and flawed intelligence---not leader personality---led to the American 
invasion of Iraq. Yet if the decision to invade may have been rational, the implementation of 
invasion was not.  This failure reflected key aspects of President Bush's personality.  
Inside Bush's Brain 
Biographies and “psychohistories” of George W. Bush began to appear shortly after he 
became Governor of Texas in 1994.  This literature uses biographical, psychoanalytic, or 
empirical perspectives to analyze Bush‟s cognitive abilities and functioning, personality, or 
emotional makeup.  Bush has not submitted himself for a psychological examination, so all three 
approaches must rely on the same available source materials (e.g., interviews, statements, news 
accounts, biographies) and/or the opinions of experts. The familiar biographical approach 
compiles a history of Bush‟s life providing psychological insights (e.g., Renshon 2004; Weisberg 
2008), but proffers neither a clinical nor empirical analysis of his psychological functioning.
2
  
The psychoanalytic approach (e.g., Frank 2004) uses the analyst‟s clinical opinion derived from 
psychoanalytically-oriented principles which are now considered largely outmoded.  The 
scientific approach provides psychological profiles derived from empirical analyses of source 
materials and/or by soliciting experts to rate Bush on standardized, scientifically validated 
psychological measures.  All three methods have their weaknesses, but in combination they have 
some descriptive power.  For the most part we will use the empirical findings from the scientific 
approach, occasionally supplemented by the other two, to assess Bush's tactical competence.  We 
do not provide a comprehensive portrayal of Bush‟s psyche, a project far beyond our scope, but 





rather discuss those aspects most relevant to decision making and leadership.  We will discuss 
Bush's intelligence, decision-making style, and basic personality.  
Is Bush Intelligent? 
We can estimate Bush‟s intelligence quotient (IQ) in several ways.  First, we use his 
college Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) score, since SAT scores correlate well with IQ measures 
(Frey and Detterman 2004).  Bush scored a 1200 on the SAT (roughly equaling 1300 on today‟s 
re-normed SAT), placing him in the top 16% of all college applicants (Immelman 2001).  
Second, we can look to Simonton‟s (2006) recent study of presidential IQ.  Simonton compiled 
personality descriptions of the presidents based on biographical sources, removed identifying 
information from the descriptions, and asked independent judges to rate each along 300 
descriptors using the Gough Adjective Checklist.  The data were then statistically analyzed to 
identify key factors relating to psychological functioning, identifying one factor called 
“intellectual brilliance” (which included adjectives such as “curious,” “wise,” “insightful,” 
“inventive,” “wide interests,” etc.).  The intellectual brilliance scores were cross-validated with 
other indices of presidential intelligence, such as recorded IQ test scores available for some of the 
presidents and other research studies that have assessed the personality trait “Openness to 
Experience,” which is correlated with intelligence.  Using these varied data and measures, 
Simonton used a statistical procedure to estimate the IQ of each president.  The best estimate 
placed Bush‟s IQ at 120-125, in the top 10% of the population and above the 115 average IQ for 
college graduates.  
Thus President Bush has a superior IQ, about the same as the estimated IQ for 
Eisenhower and Ford.  Yet he is less intelligent than most presidents, many of whom were 
brilliant.  Among the 42 other presidents, four are tied with Bush and only six rank lower in 





intellectual brilliance or IQ.   
Given the considerable political and intellectual skills required to successfully run for the 
presidency along with the demands of the office itself---in which presidents must think quickly 
and routinely make decisions based on complex information---it is not surprising that most of our 
presidents have been highly intelligent.  Studies find IQ to be a strong – often the single best – 
predictor of job performance and leadership across a variety of occupations.  Intelligence does 
correlate with measures of presidential leadership and greatness, as judged by historians and 
political scientists (Simonton 2006).
3
  Intelligence also is moderately correlated with measures of 
presidential charisma, creativity, and motivation to achieve (Simonton 2002).  Based on his IQ 
alone, we should expect that Bush will be judged by history as ranking about 26
th
 out of our 42 
presidents in presidential greatness (Simonton 2006, 523).   
What Kind of Thinker is Bush? 
 Critics charge that President Bush does not seek out information or opposing viewpoints; 
disdains complexity, nuances, and expert opinion; views policy issues in black-and-white terms 
based on his own preconceptions; and, refuses to rethink problems or change his views.  The 
research largely bears out these popular perceptions. One line of research addresses “integrative 
complexity” (IC), the complexity of a leader‟s thinking.  It is best characterized as a style of 
thinking rather than an intellectual ability, though it does correlate with intelligence (Thoemmes 
and Conway 2007).  Those having low IC “can be described as engaging in „black-or-white‟ 
thinking, all-or-nothing judgments, possessing a general inability or unwillingness to accept 
uncertainty and divergent viewpoints, and a desire for rapid closure” (Thoemmes and Conway 
2007: 195).  They “can only see things from one perspective – their own – and so no integration 
is necessary” (Simonton 2006, 522).  Researchers assess IC by randomly compiling excerpts 





from a leader‟s interviews and speeches, removing identifying information from those excerpts, 
and then having trained coders rate each statement in the excerpts for integrative complexity, as 
assessed by a standardized coding scheme for measuring IC (see Baker-Brown et al. 1992).
4
  
Thoemmes and Conway (2007) employed this methodology to assess the integrative complexity 
of all the presidents. Bush‟s integrative complexity score was about average, virtually identical to 
Reagan‟s and only a bit lower than Clinton‟s.  However, “complex presidents were…not 
significantly more likely to be considered „great‟ presidents in the eyes of history . . . what makes 
a successful leader is not so much the mean level of complexity but rather the match between 
complexity level and situation” (Thoemmes and Conway 2007, 215). 
Thus a better key to successful leadership lies in thinking complexly at the right times, in 
the right situations, and with respect to the right issues.  For example, President Reagan held a 
relatively simplistic view of the Soviet "evil empire," but showed the cognitive flexibility to 
change his views shortly after Gorbachev came to power, perhaps in part due to Reagan's own 
policies (Winik 1996).  
In contrast to his hero, Ronald Reagan, Bush failed with respect to the signature foreign 
policy decision of his presidency – the decision to invade Iraq (Weisberg 2008), a theme of 
several other chapters in this volume. Suedfeld and Leighton (2002) analyzed the statements and 
speeches made by Bush between 1999 to mid-October 2002 (the time of the attack on 
Afghanistan following 9/11), finding that his IC remained relatively low and stable throughout 
this time period, lower than that of every elected twentieth-century president from McKinley to 
Carter (see Tetlock 1981).  Bush‟s IC score “is indicative of someone who discusses issues 
without taking alternative points of view into serious consideration . . . . Bush‟s score does not 
change with the political conditions, unlike what usually holds for successful political and 





military leaders” (Simonton 2006, 522).  Simplistic thinking about policy goals, while beneficial 
in some situations, may “lead to the ignoring of crucial information or potentially successful 
decisions, to a misunderstanding of what one‟s people, allies and opponents are doing or 
thinking, and to rigid adherence to a failing plan” (Suedfeld and Leighton 2002, 587).  Though 
none have studied the matter, we suspect that President Bush's IC on education issues, on which 
he had more preexisting knowledge, would be higher. Notably, Weisberg (2008) argues that 
Bush, Woodrow Wilson, and Jimmy Carter all suffered from low IC, and all failed on their 
signature initiatives. Berggren and Rae (2006) argue that for Bush and Carter, in particular, 
evangelical faith led to foreign policy ineffectiveness.  
A third factor related both to integrative complexity and intelligence is the leader‟s 
openness to new ideas and experiences (see Simonton 2006), a trait psychologists call “Openness 
to Experience” as measured by the NEO Personality Inventory (NEO).  In Rubenzer and 
Faschingbauer‟s (2004) study, three expert raters read the available biographies of Bush and 
rated him on the NEO scales.  Bush scored a zero out of a possible 100 for openness, the lowest 
of any president (see Simonton 2006, 516).  This “suggests that his well-documented lack of 
doubt may be due to lack of introspection or inability to perceive things from a different 
perspective” (Rubenzer and Faschingbauer 2004, 303).     
Finally, although there are no empirical studies on the issue, Bush‟s inattention to detail, 
superficial approach, and relatively poor academic performance relative to his intellect might be 
explained by Attention-Deficit Disorder (ADD) or Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD) (Elovitz 2004, Frank 2004).  These learning disabilities are characterized by a difficulty 
in focusing attention and attending to detail, and often by impulsivity.   
What is Bush’s Personality? 





The leading personality theory (the “5-Factor Model”) conceptualizes personality as 
consisting of five primary facets, as assessed by the NEO (“Neuroticism-Extraversion-
Openness”) Personality Inventory: “Neuroticism” (anxiety, hostility, depression, self-
conscientiousness, impulsiveness, vulnerability to stress), “Extraversion” (warmth, 
gregariousness, assertiveness, activity level, excitement seeking, positive emotion), “Openness to 
Experience” (openness to fantasy, aesthetics, feelings, actions, ideas, and values), 
“Agreeableness” (trust, straightforwardness, altruism, compliance, modesty, tender-mindedness), 
and “Conscientiousness” (competence, orderliness, dutifulness, achievement striving, self-
discipline, deliberativeness).  According to Rubenzer and Faschingbauer‟s (2004) study 
(described above), Bush is highly extraverted but not very agreeable or conscientious; he is 
about average in neuroticism.  When compared to other presidents, his personality most closely 
resembles that of Jackson, Reagan, and Harding, though he is very unlike his father, President 
George H.W. Bush.  Indeed this dissimilarity to his father is a key theme in The Bush Tragedy 
(Weisberb 2008).  
Immelman (2002) had expert raters judge Bush‟s personality using the Millon Inventory 
of Diagnostic Criteria, a widely used personality test. Raters identified Bush as fitting the 
“Outgoing,” “Dominant (Controlling),” and “Dauntless” personality patterns, which together 
constitute a style given to unreflectiveness, superficiality, and impulsivity.  Such individuals are 
“full of ideas, though tending to be a superficial thinker; likely to start many projects but 
inconsistent in following through, compensating with a natural salesperson‟s ability to persuade 
others to join in getting things done” (see Immelman 2002, 98).  They have “the propensity for a 
superficial grasp of complex issues, a predisposition to be easily bored by routine (with the 
attendant risk of failing to keep himself adequately informed), [and] an inclination to act 





impulsively without fully appreciating the implications of his decisions or the long-term 
consequences of his policy initiatives” (Immelman 2002, 102). Immelman's findings are 
validated by Weisberg (2008, 183-220), who describes the six distinct Bush foreign policy 
doctrines in the course of the administration.  
Comparing Empirical Findings with Biographies 
 The empirical research findings confirm much of what we are told in available 
biographies, psychohistories, political commentaries, and insider accounts of the Bush 
presidency.  In The Price of Loyalty, former Bush Treasury Secretary Paul O‟Neill (2004) paints 
a portrait of Bush as a casual and unreflective decision maker who does not like to have his 
opinions challenged by advisors and who values personal loyalty above all else. 
Bush's disdain for complexity is typified by his alleged remark that he “never suffered doubt” 
about whether to invade Iraq (Woodward 2004, 420).  Bush on the Couch, Justin Frank‟s wide 
ranging psychoanalytic treatment, also describes Bush‟s tendency towards simplistic, moralistic 
thinking.
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  Similarly, Elovitz‟s (2004) psychohistorical analysis describes how gregarious and 
interpersonally skilled Bush was as a youth – often wild and mischievous, though a leader and 
always part of the “cool crowd,” disdainful of the intellectuals at the preparatory and Ivy-league 
schools he attended.   In “George W. Bush: Policy, Politics and Personality,” James Pfiffner 
(2003, 161) describes Bush as having “shown a preference for moral certainty over strategic 
calculation; a tendency for visceral reaction rather than reflection; a preference for clarity rather 
than complexity; a bias toward action rather than deliberation; and a preference for the personal 
over the structural or procedural.”  The latter explains Bush's remarkable loyalty toward 
subordinates who are themselves loyal, including cabinet members Alberto Gonzales, Donald 
Rumsfeld, and Michael Chertoff, who should have been held accountable long before they were 





actually separated from the administration (or in Chertoff's case, not separated), as well as Bush's 
failed Supreme Court nomination Harriet Miers, an impulsive, ill-considered decision based on 
personal friendship (Weisberg 2008, 15, 19, 170).  
 
Bush’s Psyche:  Implications for Presidential Leadership 
In summary, Bush is an extraverted, domineering, and somewhat adventurous and 
impulsive individual, lacking in conscientiousness, who is intelligent but relatively superficial 
and unreflective.  People with Bush‟s personality pattern are gregarious and warm, skilled at 
persuading and rallying others; they seek attention and approval from others; they are assertive, 
positive and enthusiastic; they are confident when wielding power or directing others, but not 
very accommodating of others‟ wishes; they tend to act impulsively and are relatively 
unreflective; they tend to be shallow, lacking in introspection and unwilling to grapple with 
emotional conflicts; and, they may engage in risk-taking or sensation-seeking behavior 
(Rubenzer and Faschingbauer 2004).  
 Bush‟s psyche had both positive and negative potential consequences for his presidential 
leadership (see Immelman 2002, Rubenzer and Faschingbauer 2004).  On the positive side, such 
leaders tend to be politically skilled, charismatic, energetic, and effective at rallying and shaping 
public opinion, and effective managers and delegators of authority.  On the negative side, they 
may be prone to poor and unreflective decision making, refuse to consider alternative or 
unpleasant points of view, over-rely on friendship and loyalty when making appointments, and be 
overly confident or cocky.  Bush‟s tendency towards simplistic, superficial, preconceived 
thinking, reinforced by his particular religious views, leads him to view problems in all-or-none, 
moralistic terms.  Frank (2004) and Elovitz (2004) argue that Bush is prone to psychological 





“splitting” – the emotional need to categorize people as either all good or all bad, and thus to 
personalize conflicts accordingly.   
Yet Bush is smarter than those who have “misunderestimated” him have supposed, and 
his extraverted personality supports his considerable political skills.  He was elected governor of 
Texas and president of the United States – two accomplishments requiring considerable 
intelligence, discipline, and political skill.  He is smart enough to serve as president, though not 
as smart as most presidents.  Yet in governing, he has a cognitive and personality style prone to 
ill-informed, rigid, and unreflective decision making.  Thus, Bush‟s psyche provides an 
outstanding skill set for campaigning and rallying public opinion for agreed-upon goals, but a 
poor one for governing, at least to the extent that governing requires well-considered decision 
making.  
 
Bush's Psych in Action: Success on No Child Left Behind 
 The greatest domestic achievement of the Bush administration was the No Child Left 
Behind law (NCLB), as detailed by Frederick Hess and Patrick McGuinn elsewhere in this 
volume.  Applying the Skowronek scheme described in chapter 1, in this area President Bush 
used the presidency as a battering ram to demolish an obsolete policy regime, a dauntless 
presidential action suiting his bold leadership style. This revolutionary law forces states to 
develop school standards and to test students to measure (and foster) academic growth. Schools 
and school districts must make progress toward an eventual goal of 100% proficiency for all 
groups of students, including minority, low income, and special needs students.  Those failing to 
do so are labeled "needing improvement," and eventually may face sanctions.  
 Bush's interest in education reflected his own painful experiences as a poor transfer 





student in prep school after doing well in his West Texas public school (Bush 1999), his genuine 
"compassionate conservative" goal to improve education in order to foster class mobility (a 
theme of the Afterword in this volume), and his political need to win votes from contested 
constituencies, particularly minorities and women. Texas Governor Bush immersed himself in 
education policy, crafting accountability programs building on those of his Democratic 
predecessor. Indeed Bush was more in synch ideologically with Texas Democratic legislators 
than with its more conservative Republicans.  Bush's education record earned plaudits from the 
press and from policy wonks, giving him the credentials to run for president.  In short, on 
education, had a high comfort level and felt comfortable working with Democrats.
6
  Like the rest 
of us, politicians learn from history and from their personal histories (Jervis 1976).  Governor 
Bush's political and policy success in Texas education reform provided a model for President 
Bush as a national education reformer.  Further, Bush had success embracing education 
standards.  In contrast, his limited foray into school choice, a rapid expansion of charter 
schooling with insufficient attention to quality, had mixed results (Maranto and Coppeto 2004).   
   Though Washington Democrats are far to the left of the Texas Democrats Bush knew, on 
education he and they had much in common. For years Washington policy-makers felt frustration 
as public schools received more resources without improving student achievement. By the 1990s 
centrist and even some liberal Democrats were ready to implement accountability based reforms; 
indeed President Clinton's proposed Goals 2000 resembled NCLB, but was weakened by 
Congress (McGuin 2006; Rudalevige 2002).   
 The relative bipartisan consensus on education reform made it easy for President Bush to 
involve Democrats in policy-making.  Much of NCLB came from the New Democratic 
Progressive Policy Institute, and the original White House point person for NCLB was Democrat 





Sandy Kress. Bush himself spent considerable time negotiating the details with key Democratic  
Congress members, particular Representative George Miller (D, CA) and Senator Ted Kennedy 
(D, Massachusetts) (McGuin 2006; Rudalevige 2002). The bill's progress was completely 
unaffected when Republicans lost the Senate with the defection of Senator James Jeffords in May 
2001. Of course, as Maranto and Coppeto (2004, 116) write, "compromise is easy when you get 
your way."  Bush gladly bargained away the school choice related parts of NCLB he did not care 
about to gain the testing and accountability based provisions he valued. President Bush had no 
need to show flexibility since he got what he wanted.  He also had a high level of knowledge of 
and comfort with education policy, so he could work with opponents without feeling insecure. 
 Like any complex intergovernmental law, NCLB has not been perfectly implemented by 
America's 50 states and roughly 14,000 local school districts (Hess and Finn 2007; Maranto and 
Maranto 2004). Yet the Bush administration has shown flexibility in the law's implementation, 
particularly since the President replaced Education Secretary Rod Paige with the more politically 
savvy Margaret Spellings (McGuinn 2006, 167-87).  Evidence suggests that the law has 
succeeded in pushing public schools to raise the academic achievement of traditionally low 
performing students and reducing the white-minority test score gaps (Casserly 2007).   
 In short, in Bush's preeminent domestic policy area he found success not by compromise 
but by working with Democrats who shared his goals to fashion a policy whose time had come 
(Hochschild 2003; Maranto and Maranto 2004).  Bush's knowledge of education and his ebullient 
personality combined to make him an effective salesman for policies which elites had already by 
and large accepted.  
Smart on Schools; Dumb at War 
 Education policy involves Congress and state and local governments. In sharp contrast, as 





detailed in chapter 1, presidents have unusual authority and power in foreign and defense policy, 
magnifying the impact of leader personality.  The normal structural advantages presidents hold in 
foreign policy were further magnified by the national state of emergency after 9-11, an urgency 
compounded by the shadowy anthrax attacks and  Beltway sniper in the months thereafter 
(Weisberg 2008, 189).  In the foreign policy crises, the president could operate as a unitary actor 
beyond congressional scrutiny.  
 The desire for cognitive consistency causes people to believe that unsuccessful policies 
reflect foolish or evil decision-making, but life is more complicated than that (Jervis 1976). So it 
is with the decision to invade Iraq. Unlike some contributors to this volume, we believe that the 
decision to invade Iraq was defensible. Bush's failings came less in the decision to go to war than 
in the lack of a process for that decision, his unwillingness to impose planning for the occupation 
of Iraq, his inability to recognize severely flawed occupation policies, his inability to face and 
learn from intelligence failures, and most importantly, in his inability until far too late to hold 
accountable the war's architects and set a more effective course under more effective personnel. 
These inexcusable failures in part reflect President Bush's psyche.     
How History Led to Invasion 
 President Bush's critics argue that his administration "cherry picked" intelligence to 
justify the decision to invade Iraq. Yet critics fail to consider how uncertainty and history shape 
decision-making.  As Jervis (1976) shows in his landmark Perception and Misperception in 
International Politics, foreign policy decision-makers must act with relatively little information. 
To fill in the gaps, they impose models from history to make sense of complex or uncertain 
information, particularly regarding the intent of foreign leaders---the key variable in defense 
policy.   For example, while hawks might see a failure to counter a potential adversary as 





resembling Neville Chamberlain's attempts to appease an expansionist Hitler, a dove might see 
military mobilization as akin to the risky arms buildups leading to World War I.     
 Regarding Iraq, several recent historical events shaped the views of President Bush, Vice 
President Cheney, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Defense Undersecretary Wolfowitz, and other 
key foreign policy decision-makers.  Dembrell (2008), Winik (1996), and the first person account 
of Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith (2008) show that President Reagan's 
successful efforts to end the Cold War with the collapse of Communism taught a generation of 
neoconservative thinkers that assertive foreign policies worked. Beneath this general worldview, 
specific events shaped perceptions of the Iraqi Baathist regime, as explained by Pollack (2002), 
as well as Feith (2008) and Diamond (2008): 
  Saddam Hussein's 1980 invasion of Iran, a nation far larger than Iraq, suggested a highly 
risk acceptant and aggressive personality;  
 Hussein's invasion of Kuwait after his army was depleted by eight years of war with Iran 
likewise suggested a high level of risk acceptance coupled with expansionist goals; thus shortly 
beforehand the CIA had predicted that no invasion would occur; 
 Shortly after the invasion of Kuwait, the CIA vastly overestimated the difficulty of 
defeating the Iraqi forces; 
 In 1990-91 the CIA predicted that Iraq was at least five years from developing nuclear 
weapons and had few chemical weapons. Inspections immediately after the war showed the 
regime to have much larger and more advanced WMD programs than predicted; 
 In 1994 the U.S. and its allies thought that Iraqi WMD programs had been dismantled. 
Key defectors showed that this was not the case; 
 On defecting in 1995, Iraqi intelligence chief Wafiq al-Samarra'I said that Hussein 





claimed to have learned his lesson from the first Gulf War: Once inspections ended he intended 
to reconstitute WMD programs, so he could then invade and occupy Kuwaiti and Saudi oil fields 
and deter American countermeasures.
7
  
Save in Kurdistan, the CIA had few or no intelligence assets inside Iraq through most of 
this period, and thus could not accurately assess the disparate information received from 
defectors, refugees, signals intelligence, and foreign intelligence agencies. In the 1990s the 
agency again and again was "caught by surprise with the discovery of some new secret about 
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction that had been deliberately concealed by Saddam's regime" 
(Diamond 2008, 11).   
 In short, the CIA had consistently underestimated the threat posed by the Iraqi regime, 
while overestimating the difficulties of defeating that regime in battle. These failures led 
Washington policy-makers generally to doubt CIA estimates regarding Iraq, and to err in the 
opposite direction.  Eventually the CIA did the same.  Indeed Bush critic Paul R. Pillar (2008, 
233), who questions the decision to invade Iraq, nonetheless admits that the administration was 
correct to point out that "its perception of Saddam's weapons capacities was shared by the 
Clinton administration, congressional Democrats, and most other Western governments and 
intelligence services." Further, Diamond (2008, 13) writes that: 
 
 …the Agency's embattled posture during the 9/11 Commission's investigation of 
 its failure to uncover the 9/11 plot made it more politically risky for the CIA to 
 raise skeptical questions about whether the threat posed by Iraq was as serious as 
 the White House alleged. An agency lambasted for missing clues that might have 
 unraveled the deadliest terror plot in history was now handed the mission of 





 interpreting a threat based on  abundant clues about deadly weapons in the hands 
 of a murderous dictator.  
 
In addition, as Douglas Feith (2008) explains in defending his boss, Donald Rumsfeld, after 9/11 
the Bush administration had determined to act against likely enemies before they were in a 
position to strike. This particular "Bush doctrine" then had widespread support. 
  Moreover, Bush's invasion of Afghanistan succeeded.  On a matter of great importance 
and on which nearly all Americans agreed, President Bush set a clear direction and made rational 
decisions to attack Afghanistan rather than Iraq (as Rumsfeld seemingly wanted), and to act 
quickly with small forces rather than developing a large buildup over time. Indeed his decision-
making in the run up to the Afghan invasion is given high marks by Bush appointee Feith (2008), 
but also by political scientist Donald Kettl (2003).  In Afghanistan, Bush's dauntless decision-
making may have paid off.   On the other hand, Herspring (2008) and Feith (2008) respectively 
document the raging political battles within the administration pitting Defense Secretary 
Rumsfeld against CIA Director George Tenet, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and his own 
generals even during the Afghan campaign. If Bush was even aware of these conflicts, there is no 
evidence he used them creatively to gain information from and about subordinates as a multiple 
advocacy model suggests (George 1980), or lessen conflict to improve teamwork and policy 
coordination, as an administrative presidency model counsels (Nathan 1983).  Indeed even 
insider Feith (2008, 272) admits "government coordination--- lively debate leading to solid 
teamwork---was not achieved in the Bush administration" partly since the president did not 
engage sufficiently to impose a disciplined process on subordinates. Luckily, the failings of the 
Taliban regime were such that Bush's leadership failures did not endanger initial success in 





Afghanistan.  Still, better presidential oversight might have killed or captured Osama bin Laden. 
 One final part of recent history merits discussion. As Feith (2008) writes, the CIA and 
State Department thought the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan would be far more difficult and 
require far more troops than Secretary Rumsfeld proposed.  As Bush sympathizer Victor David 
Hanson (2007) suggests, too-rapid success in Afghanistan caused hubris, and attendant failure in 
Iraq.   
 In short, the decision to invade Iraq, while perhaps mistaken, was not in and of itself 
irrational. Given the success of a very small force in Afghanistan, even the decision to invade 
Iraq with far smaller forces than Pentagon generals proposed could be defended. Had Iraq had 
extant WMD programs and had the occupation worked well, we might well be writing an essay 
about how George W. Bush's boldness, optimism, and enthusiastic big picture leadership remade 
the Middle East in a good way.   
 This was not to be. All too eager to invade, the President proved unwilling or unable to 
monitor the implementation of his decision.  Here the President's decision-making failures are 
manifest, and they reflect not modern history but Bush psychology.  As yet we have no definitive 
historical accounts of presidential decision-making during the war, in the way that we have for 
Vietnam, so we cannot discuss the process in detail.  Still, from Ricks (2007) Herspring (2008), 
Pillar (2008), and Pfiffner (2008) and Woodward (2004, 2008), failings include: 
 The President's failure to impose a "staffing" process to review options for the Iraq 
regarding whether to invade, the numbers of troops needed for the invasion, nor the proposed 
length of time and character of the occupation;    
 The President's failure to inform key members of the administration such as the Secretary 
of State until months after the decision to go to war; 





 The President's failure to study Iraq; for example he reportedly did not know about the 
differences between Sunnis and Shiites; 
 The President's failure to seriously consider views by administration insiders including 
General Eric Shinseki, General Tommy Franks, and Colin Powell that the invasion force was too 
small to occupy Iraq;  
 The President's failure to consider the views of analysts outside the administration, such 
as Clinton administration Iraq expert and Iraq hawk Kenneth Pollack (2002), who argued that an 
invasion force smaller than 300,000 troops could not maintain order, with civil war the most 
likely outcome;   
 The President's failure to review occupation plans by the Pentagon and State Department 
to see if they were in harmony, and could stand up to scrutiny;  
 The President's failure to reconsider occupation policy after widespread rioting and 
looting following the fall of Baghdad in April 2003; 
 The President's failure to demand that the military kill or capture Moqtadr al-Sadr when 
he began to kill opponents in May 2003: this signaled that occupation forces had no monopoly on 
violence, leading to civil war;  
 The President's failure to either work with Iran on Iraq border security, or else use 
sufficient force to secure the border;  
 The President's failure to question Ambassador L. Paul Bremer's decision to disband the 
Iraqi Army, which left thousands of well armed Iraqis unemployed, jump starting the insurgency; 
  The President's failure to explain to the U.S. public why the administration thought Iraq 
had WMDs, and why they in fact were not there.  This increased elite and popular distrust of the 
administration;   





 The President's failure to fundamentally rethink the occupation policy through 2003, 
2004, 2005, and 2006 as the Iraqi insurgency deepened and widened;    
 After the 2004 presidential election President Bush kept Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, the 
architect of failed Iraq policies, while hastening the departure of Secretary of State Powell, who 
had questioned those policies.  
Charitably, one might excuse failings during the 2004 presidential campaign, but not in 
2003 in the months after the invasion when the course of occupation could have been righted, or 
after the 2004 presidential campaign, when reelection was no longer a factor. In short, on 
countless occasions President Bush failed to impose a decision-making process to gather 
information, failed to monitor policy to make midcourse corrections, failed to seriously question 
subordinates, and failed to grapple with policy failures widely reported in the media. These 
failures showed an inability to consider alternative points of view and new information, a 
tendency to base policy on personal relationships, and a shocking disdain for detail. Only after 
the Republicans lost Congress in the 2006 elections, forcing his hand, did the president recognize 
the Iraqi insurgency, replace Secretary Rumsfeld, and change strategy.     
 
Conclusion: The Perils of Dauntless Decision-making 
 In short, President Bush's bold, ebullient personality and bias for action helped bring 
together Democratic and Republican elites to fundamentally reform American public schools.  
This may be his greatest legacy.  The President's boldness in Afghanistan seemingly succeeded, 
though his disdain for details limited the scope of that success.  Finally, on the signature decision 
of his administration, President Bush's tendency to make quick decisions, reluctance to admit 
error, disdain for details and experts, inability to entertain dissenting opinions, and tendency to 





categorize opponents as enemies, meant that his administration did not sufficiently plan the 
invasion of Iraq.  Further, he failed to systematically review occupation policy even as countless 
voices both inside and outside of the administration urged such a review.  Here, the President 
proved cognitively rigid; not heroically steadfast. Nor did he find the strength to fire subordinates 
who had failed, and to promote less favored subordinates who had in fact proved prescient.  
Unfortunately it is for these essentially psychological failures of decision and indecision for 
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1
  We borrow part of the title from the well-known book by James Moore and Wayne Slater, Bush’s Brain: How 
Karl Rove Made George W. Bush Presidential, which argued that presidential advisor Karl Rove was the real brains 
behind the election and presidency of George W. Bush, the 43rd president of the United States.   
2
   Also available is Bush‟s political autobiography, A Charge to Keep, published in 1999. 
3
  Statistical analyses of the ratings of presidential greatness provided by various experts indicate that they represent 
“a firm and unified consensus” that is highly reliable and remarkably consistent across raters having different 
demographic characteristics and political attitudes (Simonton 2002: 144, Simonton 2006). 
4
  Although there may be strategic political reasons for leaders to make statements reflecting less complexity than 
their own views, IC scores do predict a leader‟s actual policy choices and strategies (Suedfeld and Leighton 2002).   
5
   Frank draws many other rather controversial (see Satel 2004) conclusions as well, namely that Bush exhibits some 
relatively serious psychological symptoms largely stemming from his stern maternal upbringing, competitive 
relationship with his father, and history of alcoholism, issues often noted by Bush biographers (see Elovitz 2004, 
Renshon 2004).  In addition, Frank (and many others!) have suggested that Bush‟s decision to run for Governor of 





                                                                                                                                                             
Texas and President, and his decision to invade Iraq, were driven in part by his competitive need to live up to his 
father‟s expectations and desire to vindicate his father‟s legacy (see Elovitz 2004).  See also Weisberg (2008) on this 
theme.   
6
 Indeed Bush's comfort with education policy was such that in the third Bush-Kerry presidential debate on October 
13 2004, Bush turned a question on jobs into a fairly effective disposition on NCLB.  See Commission on 
Presidential Debates (2004) (http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2004d.html).   
7
 See Pollack (2002, 266-67). It strikes us that while the media frequently report on how silly the Bush 
administration was to believe intelligence from unreliable sources like the famous "curveball," few acknowledge 
more credible sources like al-Samarra'i. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1462386
